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JUDICIAL SPEECH: OFF-THE-BENCH
CRITICISM OF SUPREME COURT.
DECISIONS BY JUDGES FOSTERS
DISRESPECT FOR THE RULE OF
LAW AND POLITICIZES OUR SYSTEM
OF JUSTICE
Arthur L. Alarc6n*
On April 17, 1992, Robert Alton Harris, a condemned state pris-
oner, filed a civil action in the Northern District of California request-
ing a temporary restraining order to prohibit all executions in the San
Quentin gas chamber.1 Harris' execution date was April 21, 1992.2
The district court issued a temporary restraining order on April 18,
1992.3
On April 19, 1992, a three-judge panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted the state's petition for a writ
of mandate to vacate the district court's order.4 Within a few hours, a
stay of Harris' execution was issued pending an en banc determination
of the validity of the district court's temporary restraining order.5
Shortly after midnight on April 21, 1992, the United States
Supreme Court granted the State's application to vacate the stay of
execution of death.6 The Court held that the civil action was an art-
fully disguised attempt to avoid application of the ancient principle
that a petitioner abuses the writ of habeas corpus by filing successive
petitions.7 Harris had previously filed several petitions for a writ of
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
1. Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Cal. 1992). This action was filed on behalf
of several death row prisoners. Id. at 967. Harris was the only condemned man with a
scheduled execution date. Id. at 971.
2. Harris v. Vasquez, No. 92-0588-T at 1 (S.D. Cal. filed Apr. 18, 1992).
3. Fierro, 790 F. Supp. at 971.
4. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 966 F.2d 460,460 (9th Cir. 1992). Judge John
T. Noonan dissented from that opinion. Id. at 461 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
5. Harris v. Vasquez, 961 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992).
6. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992).
7. Id.; see Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224,230-32 (1924) (holding that prisoner's filing
of successive petitions for habeas corpus not permitted).
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habeas corpus in the District Court for the Southern District of
California.8
The Court explained its ruling in the following words:
Harris claims that his execution by lethal gas is cruel and
unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This case is
an obvious attempt to avoid the application of McCleskey v.
Zant, - U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517
(1991), to bar this successive claim for relief. Harris has now
ified four prior federal habeas petitions. He has made no
convincing showing of cause for his failure to raise this claim
in his prior petitions.
Even if we were to assume, however, that Harris could
avoid the application of McCleskey to bar his claim, we
would not consider it on the merits. Whether his claim is
framed as a habeas petition or § 1983 action, Harris seeks an
equitable remedy. Equity must take into consideration the
State's strong interest in proceeding with its judgment and
Harris' obvious attempt at manipulation. See In re Blodgett,
- U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 674, 116 L.Ed.2d 669 (1992); Delo
v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 110 S.Ct. 1880, 109 L.Ed.2d 325
(1990) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). This claim could have
been brought more than a decade ago. There is no good rea-
son for this abusive delay, which has been compounded by
last-minute attempts to manipulate the judicial process. A
court may consider the last-minute nature of an application
to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable
relief.
The application to vacate the stay of execution of death
is granted, and it is ordered that the orders staying the execu-
tion of Robert Alton Harris entered by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 92-70237 on
April 20, 1992 are vacated.9
Twice more that night, the Supreme Court vacated separate stays
granted by members of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
pending en banc review of the denial of the April 18, 1992 petition by
the three-judge panel.1" Harris' habeas petition was based on his
8. Harris v. Vasquez, No. 92-0588-T (S.D. Cal. filed Apr. 18, 1992); Harris v. Pulley,
No. 90-380-E (S.D. Cal. filed Mar. 26, 1990); Harris v. Pulley, No. 82-1005-E (S.D. Cal.
filed Aug. 13, 1982); Harris v. Pulley, No. 82,0249-E (S.D. Cal. filed Mar. 5, 1982).
9. Gomez, 112 S. Ct. at 1653.
10. Id.; Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713 (1992).
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brother's recantation of testimony he gave at the trial of this matter in
state court twelve years earlier." In vacating the fourth stay order
issued by various judges in the preceding twelve hours, the Supreme
Court stated: "No further stays of Robert Alton Harris' execution
shall be entered by the federal courts except upon order of this
Court."'
12
Harris was executed on April 21, 1992. Within days of Harris'
execution, several federal judges made public, off-the-bench remarks
criticizing the Supreme Court's orders in the Harris matter. One
judge wrote a guest editorial for the New York Times in which he
appeared to argue that recent decisions of the Supreme Court compel
lower federal courts to commit "'treason to the Constitution.' ",13
Four days after the execution, another judge gave a speech at the Yale
Law School that was covered by the national media. 4 The judge's
statement of his views later appeared in the Yale Law Journal.15 The
judge's audience was told that the Supreme Court's decision in the
Gomez case "was the logical culmination of a series of Supreme Court
decisions subordinating individual liberties to the less-than-compelling
interests of the state and stripping lower federal courts of the ability to
protect individual rights.' 6
None of the members of the Supreme Court responded to these
attacks. They remain unrefuted. The reason is obvious. It would be
inappropriate for the Supreme Court to join in a public controversy
11. Harris v. Vasquez, No. 92-0558-T, at 5-7 (S.D. Cal. filed Apr. 18, 1992).
12. Vasquez, 112 S. Ct. at 1714 (1992).
13. John T. Noonan, Should State Executions Run on Schedule?, N.Y. Tms, Apr. 27,
1992, at A17. Judge Noonan's criticism of the Supreme Court is expressed in the following
words:
Prompt enforcement of that penalty conflicts with the precedents built up
under the Constitution, Bill of Rights and Civil Rights Act. If death penalties are
to be inflicted according to a state's schedule, these protections must give way. A
Federal court must even commit "treason to the Constitution" and abstain from
exercising its jurisdiction.
So, at least, is the present position of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justices Harry
A. Blackmun and John Paul Stevens dissenting. That Court has resolved the na-
tional ambivalence and decided that it is intolerable for a Federal court to delay
an execution to decide a constitutional question. Robert Alton Harris was a casu-
alty of this decision. Was the Constitution, too?
Id.
14. See Katherine Bishop, No Rush to More California Executions, N.Y. TrAms, Apr.
27, 1992, at B10; Richard C. Paddock, 9th Circuit Judge Criticizes High Court over Execu-
tion, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1992, at Al.
15. Judge Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Cour the Death Penalty, and the Harris
Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205 (1992).
16. Id. at 205 (footnote omitted).
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initiated by its judicial critics, or to attempt to rally public support for
its decisions through the media or in a public forum.
I was astonished by this public, off-the-bench criticism of contem-
porary decisions of the Supreme Court by jurists whose views con-
cerning the appropriateness of a stay of Harris' execution were
rejected by the Supreme Court in the Gomez case. I had thought that
criticism of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court was
clearly contrary to elementary principles of ethical judicial conduct. It
also appeared to be terribly unfair because the authors of the criticism
must have known that the Justices of the Supreme Court could not
ethically slip off the bench to defend themselves at a press confer-
ence.17 While I had never researched the question whether it was
proper for a federal judge to use the media as a weapon to attack the
Supreme Court, I had assumed, since I was a student in law school,
that federal judges were prohibited from using the prestige of their
offices to undermine respect for the law in off-the-bench remarks.
Fortunately, since 1992, no other judge has used the media to ex-
press his or her disapproval of decisions of the Supreme Court. Hope-
fully such conduct will not recur when the next sensational death
penalty case reaches the United States Court of Appeals.
I am pleased that the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review has
afforded the participants in this Symposium the opportunity to ex-
plore, in this academic sanctuary, the question whether public off-the-
bench criticism of the decisions of our Supreme Court by federal
judges is appropriate and ethical, or antagonistic to the integrity of
our form of government and system of justice. It is my view that pub-
lic, off-the-bench criticism of the decisions of the Supreme Court by
judges of lower federal courts is prohibited by existing ethical rules. If
17. Professor William G. Ross has stated that judges should refrain from commenting
on the subject of their published opinions. He noted that a published opinion is a
self-contained entity which must speak for itself. Any public comment by a judge
concerning that opinion detracts from its integrity. Such comments may distort
the legal process by encouraging lawyers and even courts to interpret the decision
in the context of the judge's remarks. In contrast to statutes, which may be inter-
preted with reference to legislative history, a judicial decision must be its own
exponent.
William G. Ross, Extrajudicial Speech. Charting the Boundaries of Propriety, 2 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHIcs 589, 601 (1989) (footnote omitted). Additionally, Professor Ross has com-
mented that
[t]here usually is no excuse for an appointed judge to detract from the integrity of
the judicial system by offering any apology for what he has written or done.
While some judges might suppose that such comments will help to restore or
maintain public confidence in the judicial system, comments about individual de-




it is not, then rules should be adopted to make it clear that such con-
duct will not be tolerated because of the threat it would pose to the
rule of law if other lower court judges were to publicly attack deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECrrVE
Among the grievances against the King of England listed in the
American Declaration of Independence is the following: "He has
made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their of-
fices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."'18 The Declara-
tion of Independence goes on to state: "A prince, whose character is
thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the
ruler of a free people."'19
In drafting our Constitution, the Founders were determined to
protect federal judges from political control, either by the President
and Congress, or the electorate. To that end, Section 1 of Article III
of the United States Constitution provides: "The judges, both of the
Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good be-
havior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compen-
sation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office." 20
In guaranteeing lifetime appointment, the Founders insulated
federal judges from political retaliation should a majority of the elec-
torate disagree with their decisions. Removal of federal judges from
politics has served this nation well in protecting the rights of the mi-
nority from majoritarian tyranny. Judicial independence from polit-
ical concerns has resulted in decisions that ended segregation in
restaurants, buses, schools, juries, and in the workplace. Federal
judges were free to render these judgments without regard to whether
they were consistent with the contemporary views of a majority of the
voters within their jurisdiction.
The Founders made Congress and the President subject to the
political control of the electorate. The Founders wisely concluded that
law making and law enforcement should reflect the views of the ma-
jority. Whether a law is faithful to the Constitution, however, must be
determined by judges unconcerned about the politics of the moment
or election returns. Off-the-bench statements to the media in an at-
18. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
19. Id. para. 30.
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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tempt to influence public opinion threaten judicial independence by
politicizing our system of justice.
Some of us are old enough to remember others who sought to
politicize the Supreme Court because of the unpopularity of some of
its decisions by plastering "Impeach Earl Warren" signs all over our
nation's highways. Fortunately, no judicial member of the lower fed-
eral courts slipped off the bench to give legitimacy to this movement
by publicly expressing his or her disdain for the Supreme Court's
opinions. Public attacks on Supreme Court decisions by federal
judges may incite unstable members of society to engage in civil diso-
bedience and to defy the decisions of our nation's highest court, or
worse, to commit acts of violence against its members.
The political branches of our government have very effective
methods of enforcing their authority against civil disobedience. The
President can mobilize the national guard or the armed forces of the
United States. Congress can enact laws to permit administrative agen-
cies to seize property, to impose severe criminal penalties for a defi-
ance of its power, or to raise taxes to promote the general welfare.
Judges are armed only with their pens, their legal knowledge, and
their integrity. Judges must rely on our American tradition of respect
for the written opinions of our appellate courts and the principle of
stare decisis. Judges who deliberately use the media to draw attention
to their disagreement with decisions of the United States Supreme
Court encourage others to demonstrate their disrespect for the rule of
law and seriously threaten our system of justice. A decent respect for
the independence of the judicial branch of our government should
compel federal judges who do not agree with the Supreme Court to
remain silent.
II. IMPACT OF JUDICIAL CANONS ON JUDICIAL SPEECH
The goal of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (Code)
is that the "integrity and independence of the judiciary may be pre-
served."21 The Commentary to Canon I explains that "[p]ublic confi-
dence in the impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the
adherence of each judge to this responsibility."22 The Code also cau-
tions those who aspire to an appointment to the federal judiciary that,
to avoid the appearance of impropriety, "[a] judge must therefore ac-
21. CODE OF CONDUCr FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 1 (1994).
22. Id Canon 1 commentary.
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cept restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly."23
In Canon 3A(6), the Code deals expressly with extrajudicial com-
ment concerning a pending case. The Code provides: "A judge
should avoid public comment on the merits of a pending or impending
action .... ."I Criticism by a federal judge of a Supreme Court deci-
sion denying a stay of the execution of a condemned state prisoner
does not squarely fit within Canon 3A(6). Criticism of the Supreme
Court's refusal to consider the merits of the claim in Gomezs-that
the use of lethal gas violates the Eighth Amendment-clearly is pub-
lic comment on the merits of a pending case. The Gomez case in-
volved all prisoners on death row in California, not just Harris. 26 The
Gomez case was pending in the district court at the time of Judge
Reinhardt's Yale Law School speech and the publication of his re-
marks in the Yale Law Journal.27 In fact, that matter is now pending
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.28
Canon 4A authorizes a federal judge to "speak, write, lecture,
teach, and participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal
system, and the administration of justice." 29 The Commentary to Ca-
non 4 states that it authorizes a judge to advocate "revision of sub-
stantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and juvenile
justice. '30 Thus, Canon 4 appears to permit a judge to seek to influ-
ence Congress that current law requires "revision." The term "revi-
sion," however, is not applicable to off-the-bench judicial speech that
criticizes a decision of the Supreme Court.31
Professor E. Wayne Thode, the reporter for the Special Commit-
tee on Standards of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Associa-
tion, has explained that "Canon 4A permits a judge to engage in
projects directed to the drafting of legislation, and Canon 4B permits
23. Id. Canon 2A commentary.
24. Id. Canon 3A(6).
25. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992).
26. Id.
27. Reinhardt, supra note 15.
28. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, No. 94-16775 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 18, 1994).
29. CODE OF CONDUCE FOR UNTrED STATES JUDGES Canon 4A (1994).
30. Id. Canon 4 commentary.
31. The term "revise" is defined as "[t]o review and re-examine for correction. To go
over a thing for the purpose of amending, correcting, rearranging or otherwise improving
it; as, to revise statutes, or a judgment." BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 1321 (6th ed. 1990).
Webster's Dictionary defines "revise" as "to make a new, amended, improved, or up-to-
date version of:... [as in] a dictionary." WEBsTER'S THm Nnw INTERNATIONAL DiC-
TIONARY 1944 (3d ed. 1976).
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him to appear at a public hearing before an executive or legislative
body or official on matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice."'32 An off-the-bench criticism by a federal
judge of an opinion of the Supreme Court would not fit within Profes-
sor Thode's construction of the words crafted by his committee in
drafting the Code.
My research did not disclose any academic commentary on the
question whether it is proper for a federal judge to criticize Supreme
Court opinions. Those scholars who have commented on the propri-
ety of off-the-bench judicial speech appear to agree that it should be
limited. For example, one author argues that a judge may be prohib-
ited from speech that would be deemed acceptable if uttered by a pri-
vate citizen because the public is unable to distinguish between a
judge's conduct on and off the bench.33 Further, a judge's duty to rule
fairly and impartially and "to 'conduct himself at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary'-limits his Constitutional right to voice his opinions.
'34
It is no justification that the opinion that is criticized deals with
an issue that affects fundamental constitutional rights. Professor Ross
makes this point quite eloquently:
While some judges rightly may feel that discussion of the
subject requires loud or even shrill voices, it does not follow
that judges are the appropriate persons to bring additional
histrionics to an already heated subject. Just as a judge ordi-
narily should not attempt to be a scholar, so also should a
judge generally refrain from donning the mantel of the moral
philosopher, criminologist or polemicist. There are plenty of
other persons who admirably can fulfill those roles. But only
a judge can be a judge.35
The Supreme Court's recent opinions clarifying the right of a state
prisoner to obtain review of the merits of his or her federal constitu-
tional claim have inspired the critical comments of many legal writ-
32. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NoTEs TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr 75
(1973).
33. James D. Noseda, Comment, Limiting Off-Bench Expression: Striking a Balance
Between Accountability and Independence, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 519, 528 (1987).
34. Talbot D'Alemberte, Searching for the Limits of Judicial Free Speech, 61 TUL. L.
REv. 611, 613 (1987) (quoting CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 2 (1972) (footnote
omitted)).
35. Ross, supra note 17, at 627.
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ers.36 There is no evidence that any of these authors first delivered
their views to the media before their articles appeared in legal jour-
nals. This outpouring of legal commentary amply demonstrates that
there was no compelling need for any federal judge to initiate or to
join the criticism of the decisions of the nation's highest court.
Failure to refrain from making off-the-bench comments to the
media or in a public forum regarding sensitive issues "may undermine
faith in the judicial system even if there is no actual impropriety on
the bench since such pronouncements suggest that judges may permit
their personal predilections to prevent them from enforcing the law as
written. '37
II. CONCLUSION
The Code does not expressly prohibit public, off-the-bench criti-
cism by judges of Supreme Court decisions. It is my view that the
present Code implicitly prohibits such conduct because it may "be
misunderstood by the public as being unwilling to enforce the law as
written, thereby undermining public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. '38 Each federal judge is under a duty to
36. See, e.g., Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal
Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REv. 371 (1991); Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to
Its Logical Extreme: A Comment on Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2453 (1993);
Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent Proposals to
Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1665 (1990); Steven G. Cala-
bresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102
YALE L.J. 255 (1992); Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of
Robert Alton Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992); Markus Dirk Dubber, Prudence and Sub-
stance: How the Supreme Court's New Habeas Retroactivity Doctrine Mirrors and Affects
Substantive Constitutional Law, 30 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1 (1992); Joseph L. Hoffman, Is
Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme Court's Continuing Problems with
Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. LJ. 817 (1993); Joseph L. Hoff-
mann, Starting from Scratch. Rethinking Federal Habeas Review of Death Penalty Cases, 20
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 133 (1992); Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, Public Policy
Lessons from the Robert Alton Harris Case, 40 UCLA L. REv. 295 (1992); Henry J. Reske,
Courts Battle over Harris Execution, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 78; Eric D. Scher, Sawyer v.
Whitley: Stretching the Boundaries of a Constitutional Death Penalty, 59 BRooK. L. Rnv.
237 (1993); Charles M. Sevilla & Michael Laurence, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present
Discontents: The Death Penalty Case of Robert Alton Harris, 40 UCLA L. REv. 345
(1992); J. Thomas Sullivan, "Reforming" Federal Habeas Corpus: The Cost to Federalism,;
the Burden for Defense Counse4 and the Loss of Innocence, 61 UMKC L. REv. 291 (1992);
Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative "Reform" of Federal
Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent Developments and Current Proposals, 55
ALE. L. REv. 1 (1991); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2331
(1993).
37. Ross, supra note 17, at 629.
38. In re Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950, 954 (Fla. 1982).
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preserve "the integrity and independence of the judiciary."3 9 The fact
that there are no reported cases concerning the propriety of extrajudi-
cial public criticism of Supreme Court opinions by federal judges is
probably due to the fact that it has been assumed by members of the
judiciary that it is improper, whether or not such speech is actually
barred by the Code.
Judges should heed the advice of the former chief justice of the
Supreme Court of the Province of British Columbia who admonishes
newly appointed jurists as follows:
You will be asked to make speeches to legal and other
organizations and you may properly accept such invitations
and comment fairly freely on the law as it is, less freely on the
law as you think it ought to be. Any criticism, direct or im-
plied, of... delivered judgments is generally to be avoided in
statements made off the bench, lest your hearers infer criti-
cism of a... court and hence, perhaps, political bias, or dis-
respect for other courts.40
In summary, the Code sets forth minimum standards of ethical
judicial conduct. Judges should refrain from off-the-bench public
comment that "fall[s] far short of any speech that would warrant sanc-
tions. Like any other restraint, the best form of judicial restraint is
self-restraint.
'41
39. CODE OF CoNDucr FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 1 (1994).
40. L. Yves Fortier, Should Judges Speak Out?, JUDGES' J., Summer 1985, at 42, 45
(quoting J.O. WILSON, A BooK FOR JUDGES (1980)).
41. Ross, supra note 17, at 596.
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